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Utah Code Ann.. § 63-46b-l(9) (Supp. 1992): 
Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to 
restrict a presiding officer, for good cause 
shown, from lengthening or shortening any time 
period prescribed in this chapter, except 
those time period established for judicial 
review. 
Utah Code Ann.. § 63-46b-12(l)(a) (1988): 
If a statute or the agency's rules permit 
parties to any adjudicative proceeding to seek 
review of an order by the agency or by a 
superior agency, the aggrieved party may file 
a written request for review within 30 days 
after the issuance of the order with the 
person or entity designated for that purpose 
by the statute or rule. 
Utah Code Ann.. § 63-46b-17(1)(b) (1987): 
In granting relief, the court may: 
(i) order agency action required by law; 
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discretion as 
required by law; 
(iii)set aside or modify agency action; 
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(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of agency 
action; or 
(v) remand the matter to the agency for further 
proceedings. 
RULES: 
Rule 6(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
When by these rules or by a notice given 
thereunder or by order of the court an act is 
required or allowed to be done at or within a 
specified time, the court for cause shown may 
at any time in its discretion (1) with or 
without motion or notice order the period 
enlarged if request therefore is made before 
the expiration of the period originally 
prescribed or as extended by a previous order 
or (2) upon motion made after the expiration 
of the specified period permit the act to be 
done where the failure to act was the result 
of excusable neglect; but it may not extend 
the time for taking any action under rules 
50(b), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), 60(b) and 
73(a) and (g), except to the extent and under 
the conditions stated in them. 
Rule 81(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
These rules shall apply to the practice and 
procedure in appealing from or obtaining a 
review of any order, ruling or other action of 
an administrative board or agency, except 
insofar as the specific statutory procedure in 
connection with any such appeal or review is 
in conflict or inconsistent with these rules. 
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REPLY ARGUMENTS 
I. THE COMMISSION ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN 
IT REVERSED THE ALJ's ORDER AND ENTERED 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST MAGCORP AND ALSO WHEN 
IT ORDERED MAGCORP TO PROVIDE AND PAY FOR 
LAUNDRY SERVICES FOR ITS EMPLOYEES. 
Respondent, Industrial Commission of Utah, concedes the legal 
and factual correctness of the argument raised in Point II of 
Magnesium Corporation of America's ("Magcorp") opening brief. 
Respondent's Brief at 5, 6-8. Based on similar legal principles, 
respondent also necessarily concedes the argument raised in Point 
III of Magcorp's opening brief. In fact, respondent fails to 
address Magcorp's Point III. It is therefore undisputed that the 
Industrial Commission erred as a matter of law when it summarily 
reversed the ALJ's June 10, 1992 Order and entered summary judgment 
against Magcorp and also when it ordered Magcorp to provide and pay 
for laundry services for its employees. 
With those concessions having been made, only two main issues 
remain to be decided by this court. Those issues - whether this 
court should remand the case for further evidentiary hearing and 
whether the Commission properly exercised jurisdiction over this 
matter - are further addressed in Points II and III of this Reply 
Brief. 
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II. REMAND OF THIS MATTER TO EITHER THE COMMISSION 
OR THE ALJ IS IMPROPER KT THIS CASE. 
Respondent requests, .r K)ir/. Two r?, brief, that the 
in 
8. This request contradj«. Lr. trie statemenr /..: :e tdi , er 
Respondents Brief that "the Commission shou] i ^ emanded the 
Respondent's n i e i i- Because U O S H ^ Morion r-or Review was 
M ! ^ H inorp tha- i=juc after * hp Order +\he F ndings -f r^+-
Commission r i ;v
 f the Industrial Commission lacked 
jurisdiction r ^ consider ^ e Motion *-"' Review \ccordingly, both 
I In nnJei ijtaiil iiu'i Hi >L. 11.HI I in keviuw entered by the Industr ial 
Commission on December 1 7, 1992, and the Interim Order Denying 
Motion To Dismiss entered on October 9, 1992, are 1 m i l and void. 
Therefore, the proper remedy is that those orders be declared void 
for lack of jurisdiction and the ALJ's June 1 0, 1992, Order be 
reinstated as the f:-' ' iudgmenu ±n unis case. Maac .r\ ' • -. fuments 
addressing the juri _ _ _ ! issues are «pt LOLX.. * , .,^/t I : >f 
Magcorp's opening brief at rp 1 --•'<• *n\ \ ir rcint: 111 of this Reply 
Briei 
Utah Code Ann. . § 63-46b • 1 ; (J ) (b) (] 98r; ) , states the kinds of 
relief that may be granted on judicial review of agency 
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(b) In granting relief, the court may: 
(i) order agency action required by law; 
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discretion as 
required by law; 
(iii)set aside or modify agency action; 
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of agency 
action; or 
(v) remand the matter to the agency for further 
proceedings. 
Magcorp requests this court to grant relief pursuant to § 63-46b-
17(1)(b)(i) and (iii). The Industrial Commission's actions should 
be set aside and the ALJ's June 10, 1992 Order and the Findings Of 
Fact And Conclusions Of Law should be reinstated. Respondent's 
request that the case be remanded for an additional evidentiary 
hearing pursuant to § 63-46b-17(l)(b)(v) contradicts its earlier 
statement that the Industrial Commission's decisions should be "set 
aside", presumably pursuant to § 63-46b-17(b)(iii). Respondent's 
Brief at 8. In addition, there are no disputed questions of fact 
that were preserved by UOSH and then detailed in an orderly fashion 
in its Brief to support the claimed need for an evidentiary 
hearing. 
Even if this court were to determine that the Industrial 
Commission properly exercised jurisdiction over this matter, a 
remand to the Commission for any purpose other than to direct the 
Commission to return the case to the ALJ for a full hearing 
addressing the merits of the Citation And Notification Of Penalty 
at issue would be improper and would substantially prejudice 
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Magcorp r v jeprivinq : the initial hearing before the A 
wh i clin i IfCien i <int n t I o\ I i I I 
Ilot entered summary jddgment Magcorp#s favor. 
III. BECAUSE UOSH FILED ITS MOTION FOR REVIEW 
THIRTY-SIX DAYS AFTER THE UNDERLYING ORDER WAS 
"ISSUED," THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION COULD NOT 
EXERCISE JURISDICTION OVER THIS CASE, AND THIS 
COURT'S LIMITED REMAND COULD NOT INVEST THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION WITH JURISDICTION TO 
ENTER ITS ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR EXTENSION 
OF TIME. 
Respondent incorrectlv claims that UOSH's fail irp +•'-• nie it** 
Utah Code Ann.. 
**•• i^ i i should be excused due to "human error" and 
chancre ^ **s " Respondents *^ i*?f *:* ]- ^ is frup 
that thifj appr .11 i m • 111 vi,1 liiuiuii i i n mi i u i unissj i 
equally clear that the determinative law ha- not changed. Dusty's 
, U tal i. State Tax. Commission, 842 p.2u •'* (Utah 1992) (per 
curiam), clearly establishes that the term 'issuance" as used n 
Utah Code Ann., § 6 3-4 6b-12(1)(a), has always referred to the date 
It appears to this court that the statutory 
instructions are quite straightforward. 
* * * 
Dusty's argument that the date of issue is 
ambiguous and subject to several inconsistent 
interpretations is not persuasive. 
*** 
[W]e hold that the date the order constituting 
the final agency action issues is the date the 
order bears on its face. Support for that 
conclusion is found in the UAPA itself. 
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Section 63-46b-21 governs agency action on 
declaratory orders• After receiving petitions 
for declaratory orders, agencies may again 
issue written orders. Copies of all orders 
issued in response to requests for declaratory 
proceedings must be mailed promptly to 
petitioners or other parties. Inasmuch as 
declaratory orders have the same status and 
binding effect as any other orders issued in 
an adjudicative proceeding, it follows that 
the differentiation between issuance and 
mailing may not be limited to declaratory 
orders alone. 
Dusty's 842 P.2d at 870. Furthermore, like the petitioner in 
Dusty's. UOSH had actual and constructive notice of the June 10, 
1992 date appearing of the ALJ's Order and the Findings Of Fact And 
Conclusions Of Law. Dusty7s 842 P. 2d at 870. The analysis 
utilized by the Utah Supreme Court in Dusty/s is consistent with 
general principles of statutory construction: 
[I]t is helpful to examine preceding sections 
within the same Act. Indeed, to interpret 
section 16-11-13, basic rules of statutory 
construction compel us to look at the 
Professional Corporation Act in its entirety. 
See Morton Int'1, Inc. v. Auditing Div., 814 
P.2d 581, 591 (Utah 1991) (fI[T]erms of a 
statute are to be interpreted as a 
comprehensive whole and not in a piecemeal 
fashion."); CP Nat'l Corp. v. Public Serv. 
Comm'n, 678 P.2d 519, 523 (Utah 1981) 
(doubtful words are to be determined in light 
of their association with surrounding words 
and phrases). 
Berrett v. Purser & Edwards. 240 U.A.R. 4, 5, P.2d (Utah 
1994) . 
At the heart of respondent's argument that its Motion For 
8 
Review was timely f 11ed ard therefore the Industrial Commission 
retained jurisdictior units c h 
Code Ann. .-* ^n^r .,*_,, r, teuana *, 6 3-
46b-1(9) is fiaweo for several reasons, primary among them the 
asser-* : > - n 
that , » equests ^ i extensio . - Lilea within a 
particular time." Respondent's Brief at \ t - axiomatic that 
a pres i (I i in) nif I 11 i m was 
requested by a party _o uu >u. . n this case UOSH did not request 
an enlargement of timp u n f : nearly eleven months after the A1.J 's 
( * * il h1. .in Ler ! lagcorp filed its 
Petition * :t Wrjt Of Review. in addition, the Motion For Extension 
Of Ti me was directed to fh^ Industrial Commissior. rather thar 4 h e 
/ " LiteM ki uj 4bii hi le request tor 
enlargement of time was r ot properly rai sed before the lower 
tribunal and preserved f~>~ appeal. 
I - . . . . :ws a party to 
request an enlargement or tune at any time after trv 3"= day period 
provided by J 3~46b~i2 (a j ^ x) creates a cor.or :' n 
1 v..
 : -2 :. 
A cardinal rule of statutory construction is 
that courts are not to infer substantive terms 
into the text that were not already there. 
Rather, the interpretation must be based on 
the language used, and the court has no power 
to rewrite the statute to conform to an 
intention not expressed. Mountain States Tel. 
& Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 155 P. 2d 
184, 185 (Utah 1945); see Trittipo, 561 N.E. 
2d at 1203 ("The statute should be interpreted 
on the basis of what was written, and courts 
should not search for subtle or not readily 
apparent intention of the legislature."). 
Berrett v. Purser & Edwards. 240 U.A.R. at 6. Section 63-46b-l(9) 
is not a specific grant of authority to do anything. The clear 
language of § 63-46b-12(l)(a) allowing 30 days should control. 
Respondent has made no effort to counter Magcorp's argument that 
the strained interpretation the Industrial Commission adopted and 
that respondent advances now on appeal is simply inconsistent with 
sensible notions of finality and judicial economy. Under the rule 
for which respondent argues, the result would be chaotic 
administrative and judicial appellate procedure. See e.g. Silva v. 
Dept. of Employment Security. 786 P.2d 246, 247 (Utah App. 1990) 
(per curiam); Isaacson v. Doriousr 669 P.2d 849, 851 (Utah 1983). 
"Endorsing such a procedure would allow mischievous counsel to use 
the right... [to belatedly request an enlargement of time] as a 
tool for needless, and in some cases harmful delay." Maverik 
Country Stores v. Industrial Commission. 860 P.2d 944, 951 (Utah 
App. 1993) (addressing a party's failure to comply with rules for 
getting an extension of filing deadline). 
Also conspicuously absent from respondent's brief is any 
effective response to Magcorp's argument that Rules 6(b) and 81(d), 
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U.R.C.P., apply to require UOSH to show excusable neglect before an 
extension of time could be granted. Rule 81(d) provides: 
These rules shall apply to the practice and 
procedure in appealing from or obtaining a 
review of any order, ruling or other action of 
an administrative board or agencyf except 
insofar as the specific statutory procedure in 
connection with any such appeal or review is 
in conflict or inconsistent with these rules, 
(emphasis added). 
It is only through application of Rule 6(b) that the needed 
certainty with respect to the time for review may be had in cases 
such as this where a party seeks an enlargement of time after the 
specified 30 days provided by § 63-46b-12(l)(a) has expired. Rule 
6(b) provides: 
When by these rules or by a notice given 
thereunder or by order of the court an act is 
required or allowed to be done at or within a 
specified time, the court for cause shown may 
at any time in its discretion (1) with or 
without motion or notice order the period 
enlarged if request therefor is made before 
the expiration of the period originally 
prescribed or as extended by a previous order 
or (2) upon motion made after the expiration 
of the specified period permit the act to be 
done where the failure to act was the result 
of excusable neglect; but it may not extend 
the time for taking any action under Rules 
50(b), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), 60(b) and 
73(a) and (g), except to the extent and under 
the conditions stated in them. (emphasis 
added). 
If this court determines that a motion to enlarge the time provided 
by § 63-46b-12(l)(a) is permissible, it necessarily follows that 
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the motion must be made in accord with Rule 6(b) and that excusable 
neglect must be shown. Respondent has made no attempt to show, and 
under the facts of this case respondent cannot establish, excusable 
neglect. "A flat mistake of counsel about the meaning of a statute 
or rule may not justify relief: relief is not extended 'to cover 
any kind of garden variety oversight.'" Prowswood, Inc.f v. 
Mountain Fuel Supply Co.. 676 P.2d 952, 960 (Utah 1984) (footnote 
omitted), (citing Feltch v. General Rental Co., 383 Mass. 603, 421 
N.E. 2d 67, 73 (1981)). The kind of human error that occurred here 
is not sufficient to warrant relief. See Varian-Eimac v. 
Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 571 (Utah App. 1989); Nunley v. Stan Katz 
Real Estate, Inc. , 15 Utah 2d 126, 388 P.2d 798, 801 (1964); In re: 
Bundy's Estate, 121 Utah 299, 241 P.2d 462 (1952). 
Maverik v. Industrial Commission, relied on by respondent for 
the proposition that good cause is the applicable standard, does 
not consider, and indeed does not preclude, the application of Rule 
6(b) via Rule 81(d) to enlargements of time sought in 
administrative proceedings after the specified window has closed. 
Respondent also fails to address Magcorp's argument that the 
Industrial Commission's October 20, 1993 Order Granting Motion For 
Extension Of Time [R. 533-537] is an improper nunc pro tunc order. 
This court should therefore assume respondent has no justifiable or 
meritorious response. UOSH did not file a motion for extension of 
12 
time with either the ALJ or the Industrial Commission prior to 
filing its Motion For Review with the Industrial Commission, and 
neither the ALJ nor the Commission addressed the issue at that 
time. The request was not properly raised or preserved by 
respondent in the administrative proceeding, therefore, the Order 
Granting Motion For Extension Of Time reflected only "what... [the 
Industrial Commission] might or should have done had there been a 
motion or a hearing.] Southwick v. Leone. 860 P.2d 973, 978 (Utah 
App. 1993); see also Preece v. Preece, 682 P.2d 298, 299 (Utah 
1984); Baashaw v. Baashaw. 788 P.2d 1057, 1061 (Utah App. 1990). 
This court's limited remand could not revive the jurisdiction the 
Industrial Commission was divested of when UOSH failed to file its 
Motion For Review in time. 
CONCLUSION 
Magcorp requests this court to reinstate the ALJ's June 10, 
1992 Order and to declare three orders issued by the Industrial 
Commission null and void. The Interim Order Denying Motion To 
Dismiss [R. 288-291] entered on October 9, 1992, and the Order 
Granting Motion For Review [R. 336-341] entered on December 17, 
1992, were made after the Industrial Commission had lost 
jurisdiction over the case because UOSH failed to file its Motion 
For Review within the 30 day window provided by law. This court's 
April 29, 1993 limited remand could not, independent of the 
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Industrial Commission's statutory jurisdiction, confer jurisdiction 
upon the Industrial Commission. Thus, the Order Granting Motion 
For Extension Of Time [R. 533-538] entered on October 20, 1993, is 
also null and void. The ALJ's June 10, 1992 Order should be 
reinstated as, and thereafter remain, the final disposition of this 
proceeding. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of July, 1994. 
CONDJSK^ WANGSGARD & TSAKALOS 
Conder 
Peter I^ f Rognlie 
Attorneys for Magcorp 
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